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Abstract:
This article focuses on the spatial autocorrelation of homicidal violence and the presence of groups that have the
capacity to exercise sovereignty. These actors possess necro-power and operate sometimes within, sometimes
outside the framework of the law. They are sometimes in opposition to one another, while at other times they
operate in a coordinated fashion. Their presence gives form to what we shall call necro-spaces: places where dif -
ferent actors (hitmen, dealers, the police or the military) spread death and destruction, in indefinite confronta-
tions with no foreseeable victor. The methodology of our analysis of the spatial autocorrelation of homicidal viol-
ence at the municipal level in the years 2005, 2010 and 2015 enabled us to connect the spatial relationships
among the homicides with descriptions of the groups that build regimes of violence in those spaces. 
Keywords: Mexico, homicides, violence, necro-spaces, sovereignty.
For the last twenty years, Mexico has lived under the
menace  of  violence.  Kidnappings,  robberies,  extor-
tions, executions, disappearances, femicides, behead-
ings, and the discovery of pits filled with hundreds of
bodies are only some of the horror stories to appear in
the media, academic discourse, and everyday conver-
sation.  While  violence  appears  to  be  spreading,  we
must  remember  that  the  country  a  long  decline  in
homicidal violence, a trend that only began to reverse
in 2008. This reversal can be attributed to a series of
joint operations between 2006 and 2012, in which the
local and state police, the army, the navy, and the air
force took action against  drug production and traf-
ficking. These raids were considered a pivotal moment
in what the federal government called the war against
drug trafficking  (Rodríguez 2016), generating an esca-
lation  of  violence  characterized  by  a  surge  in  con-
frontations  between  criminal  groups  and  between
these groups and military and police forces. As a re-
sult, Mexico rose to join the top ten countries with the
highest level  of  homicides in Latin America in 2010
(World Health Organization 2014).
The increase in homicide mortality was not evenly
distributed across the country. In the majority of fed-
eral states homicide rates stayed below the national
average.  The violence has been concentrated mostly
in the northern region of Mexico, particularly in Chi-
huahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Nayarit, and Baja Califor-
nia,  and in the south,  in Guerrero.  We should note
that the presence of federal operatives linked to the
war on drug trafficking was not ultimately the only
cause of the increase in the intensity of violence. In
certain states impunity,  alcohol consumption, drugs,
and  school  dropout  trends  play  a  crucial  role
(González et al. 2012). These same factors are related
to the presence of homicidal violence at a local scale.
Additionally,  in locations where there were no joint
operations, the increase in violence could be better ex-
plained by  economic factors  (Flores  and Rodríguez-
Oreggia  2014).  Thus,  violence  does  not  spread  ran-
domly at a local scale. It is linked to the presence of
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violence regimes corresponding either to the direct in-
tervention  of  state  forces  or  to  socioeconomic  pro-
cesses.
While military and police intervention and socioeco-
nomic  processes  are  both  linked  to  the  increase  in
homicidal  violence at  local  and regional  levels,  it  is
important to consider that in some cases violence is
the result of the persistent historical presence of orga-
nized crime groups.  Therefore,  these actors are ulti-
mately less of an externality than permanent figures
that build a certain social order, together with other
local actors from the social and political sphere. Al-
though the war on drug trafficking caused violence lo-
calized in particular municipalities to spill  over into
neighboring  municipalities,  it  retreated  to  its  tradi-
tional  borders  once  the  state’s  joint  operations  de-
creased.  Thus,  the  presence  of  actors  linked  to  the
production  of  violence  in  all  its  forms—organized
crime and state forces—did not vanish but receded to
the spaces  where these  actors  had had a  historical
presence.
From our perspective, this shows that there are lo-
calities where violence is traditionally ingrained due
to  the  presence  of  institutional  and criminal  actors
with the capacity for sovereignty (Mbembe 2011)—ac-
tors with the strength to decide who lives and who
dies within a specific space and population. These are
actors  possess  a  necro-power  operating  sometimes
within, sometimes outside the framework of the law.
They may be in opposition to one another, or operate
in a coordinated fashion. Their presence gives form to
what we shall call necro-spaces: places where differ-
ent  actors  (professionals  like  assassins,  dealers,  the
police or the military) confront each other and spread
death and destruction, indefinitely, in confrontations
without clear long-term victors.1 The objective of this
article is to analyze the regional dynamics of violence
in Mexico and how violence condenses in these local
spaces by studying the presence of high violence ar-
eas that remain so over time, independent of the “war
on drugs” policy implemented between 2006 and 2015.
1 The concept of necro-spaces distinguishes itself from the 
concept of state capture and silenced zones in its emphasis 
on the presence of diffeerent actors with the ability to exer-
cise sovereignty, that is, the power of life and death within 
this territory.
One way to identify necro-spaces is through analyz-
ing the distribution of homicides at a local scale. One
effective approach is to study the spatial autocorrela-
tion of  homicidal violence—the degree to which the
pattern of homicidal violence in one geographical unit
is similar to the pattern in neighboring geographical
units—and the presence of groups that have the ca-
pacity to exercise sovereignty: the ability to decide on
life and death in a particular space or territory. Thus,
our  paper  seeks  to  reveal  the  links  between  space,
criminal actors, and state actors.
The paper opens with a section in which we discuss
relevant  concepts:  in  addition  to  the  previously  de-
fined necro-spaces,  we place particular emphasis  on
the concepts  of  sovereignty and necro-power  devel-
oped by Mbembe (2011) and spaces of violence pro-
posed by Gros (2006). In the second section we build a
measure  of  spatial  autocorrelation  that  allows  the
identification  of  spaces  where violence depends not
only on the traits that define the locality but also on
the violence in neighboring localities over a period of
ten years (2005–2015).  We show that homicidal vio-
lence is not distributed at random: it follows specific
spatial logics, which also involve the presence of cer-
tain sovereign actors. The presence of the latter is an-
alyzed in a third section, in which we examine how
these actors impose death management on the popu-
lation. In the final section, we present conclusions and
outline recommendations for future work.
1 Sovereignties and Necro-Power
For Mbembe, sovereignty is an exercise of power that
does not necessarily rest upon the state or within a
government apparatus.2 Sovereignty lies within every
social or institutional actor that can decide who lives
and who dies. In other words, “sovereignty is the ca-
pacity to define who holds importance and who does
not,  who holds  value  and is  easily  replaceable,  and
who is not” (translated from Mbembe 2011, 46). Orga-
2 It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the context 
of the theoretical emergence of Mbembe’s concept in his 
discussion of Foucault, Weber, and postcolonial theory (see 
Wright 2011 and Monárrez 2014, 2015). We are only inter-
ested in the concept of necro-power as a tool to account for 
the capacity of certain actors with sovereignty to exercise 
violence by establishing forces that grant them power of life
and death in a specific territory, creating spaces and 
regimes of violence.
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nized  crime  groups,  guerrillas,  hitmen,  self-defense
groups and warlords,  as  well  as military and police
forces, hold that power, regardless of whether they ex-
ercise  it  legally  or  illegally,  legitimately  or  illegiti-
mately.  To  Mbembe  (2011),  necro-power  assumes
greater  visibility  when  its  exercise  gives  shape  and
form to space: when violence is used to restrict and
forbid access to certain areas by restraining people’s
movement.
Local  government  institutions  function  as  incom-
plete mechanisms of public management when these
actors  hold  sway,  overlapping  with  “the  geographi-
cally intertwined de facto legal instances, the different
duties  of  fidelity,  asymmetric  sovereignties,  and en-
claves” (translated from Mbembe 2011, 57). When this
happens,  diverse  forces—public  and  private,  institu-
tional and criminal—cohabit and are articulated in a
complex manner,  and claim their right  to exert  vio-
lence and to kill. The traditional ideas of violence, le-
gality, and death are therefore disrupted in these spa-
ces  (Gros  2006).  But  necro-spaces  cannot be under-
stood as war zones in the traditional sense. In tradi-
tional war zones, it is impossible to achieve a regu-
lated exchange of death—even by international agree-
ment—between opposing armies, and values such as
courage,  obedience, and sacrifice are foremost (Gros
2006). In contrast, relationships of recognition are dis-
solved in necro-spaces: enemies and allies are never
clearly defined.
When  armed  groups  face  each  other  in  endless
scattered  confrontations,  they spread death in their
wake. In fact, the fights that take place in rural and
urban areas never really determine the course of fu-
ture battles: Sometimes a group moves into a plaza,
making others retreat, the latter then hoping to deal a
strong blow to regain control of the lost plaza or ob-
tain a new one.3 It is in these necro-spaces that the
population experiences the worst suffering: people are
kidnapped,  disappeared,  pillaged,  exploited,  and
sometimes massacred. In these spaces, it is not possi-
ble  to  talk  about  violence  someday  giving  way  to
peace. Peace was always the opposite of war, and in
3 Plaza is defined here as “a territory where drug traffeicking 
takes place thanks to an agreement between the authorities 
and those who pay for the plaza and have the ability and re-
sources to control and exploit it” (translated from Valde<s 
2013, 129–30).
necro-spaces,  confrontations  drag  on  indefinitely.
Thus, times of peace are seen as interludes between
ongoing episodes or cycles of death and barbarism.
In Mexico, the presence of these spaces of violence
is not a new phenomenon. Since the sixties and seven-
ties,  certain regions have been marked by the pres-
ence of divergent sovereignties: white guards, chiefs,
the army, the police, guerrilla groups, or armed groups
linked  to  crime  (Pansters  2012).  Most  of  the  con-
frontations  between  these  opposing  sovereignties
were specifically  bound to particular regions in cer-
tain states. However, some of these sovereignties dis-
appeared  in  the  following  decades,  in  certain  cases
substituted by the presence of drug trafficking groups.
The latter acquired a relevant power that gave them
control over specific spaces, many times in collusion
with or with the acquiescence of federal, state and lo-
cal authorities.
One way to understand the confluence of different
sovereignties is by the trails they leave behind. One of
these is the homicide rate, whose spatial distribution
reveals  the  presence  of  a  necro-power.  In  Mexico,
these spaces of violence can be identified by examin-
ing  the  spatial  dependency  that  arises  when  the
homicide rate in one locality is affected by the homi-
cide rates in the neighboring localities. A space of vio-
lence is  characterized by a homicide rate above the
national  average,  where  surrounding  localities  also
have  homicide  rates  above  the  national  average.
Therefore, violence in a determined space should not
be understood as the result of a randomized process,
but  is  based on  wider  territorial  logics  that  involve
neighboring localities. These logics suggest the pres-
ence of socially and institutionally geographically in-
tertwined actors with the ability to regulate the move-
ment of the population and determine who lives and
who dies.
2 Methodology
To investigate the geographical intertwining of actors
with the capacity to exert necro-power, we first ana-
lyzed the spatial autocorrelation of homicidal violence
and then examined the presence of groups with the
ability  to  exercise  sovereignty.  Through  statistical
analysis we establish whether there is a spatial rela-
tionship  among  homicides  in  neighboring  localities.
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We also  introduce  elements  of  a  qualitative  nature
with the description of sovereign groups that repre-
sent possible associated factors for that relationship
(Andrejevic  2014;  Boyd  and  Crawford  2012;  Hilbert
2016). Using the two methodologies allows us to in-
vestigate links between the exercise of power by insti-
tutional and non-institutional forces and specific pat-
terns  of  violence.  The  two  methodologies  are  de-
scribed below.
Violence is a complex phenomenon to measure. One
way to approximate it is by studying homicides, par-
ticularly homicide rates. We used state-level and mu-
nicipal-level information on homicides obtained from
the Vital Statistics of Mortality provided by the Na-
tional Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) in
Mexico, covering three-year periods (2004–2006, 2009–
2011,  and 2014–2016).  The population figures neces-
sary  to  estimate  the  mortality  rates  were  also  ob-
tained from INEGI. Deaths by homicide were in accor-
dance  with  the  International  Classification  of  Dis-
eases  (ICD-10),  where  they  appear  in  the  “Assault”
section (Y85–Y09, Y87.1). We used homicide as our vi-
olence indicator because it  is  a particularly extreme
crime, and because it is registered especially precisely
and thoroughly (CEPAL 1999).
The analysis of mortality must take different popu-
lation sizes into account (Echarri 2012). We estimated
homicide mortality rates for states and municipalities.
As  Wong  (2004)  suggests,  the  geographic  units  of
analysis  can affect  the picture of  social  phenomena
and social processes; he calls this the modifiable areal
unit problem (MAUP). Taking this into consideration,
we centered our analysis at the municipal level. Mor-
tality  data  at  this  scale  allow us  to  establish  more
clearly  the  relationships  between  the  actors  of  vio-
lence and the spaces where they operate. If the ques-
tion is studied at the state level, the violence dynam-
ics could be obscured, as homicides do not occur ho-
mogenously at that scale. Thus, it is critical for us to
study  this  phenomenon at  the  municipal  scale.  We
present the homicide mortality rates at the state level
simply to contextualize them in the Mexican context.
To  obtain  the  mortality  rates,  we  averaged  the
deaths that occurred in three consecutive years (for
example, 2004, 2005 and 2006), with the central year
of that period being the one we were interested in (in
this case 2005); by doing this, we aimed to reduce the
mortality rate variation, especially in states or munici-
palities with small  populations (Preston et al.  2001).
These are good indicators for measuring the severity
of violence in a population (Elgar and Aitken 2011),
which allow comparison between states, regions and
municipalities (Echarri 2012).
It is common for a municipality’s homicide rate to
depend not only on its own traits but also on the rates
in neighboring localities (Formisano 2002). This means
that homicides have repercussions and somehow de-
pend  on  the  homicides  in  neighboring  localities
(Baller et al. 2001). To determine the possible spatial
relation between homicides in neighboring localities,
we  analyzed  the  spatial  correlation  to  describe  the
spatial distribution and identify regimes and spaces of
violence. This method shows the degree of connection
among homicide rates in geographically neighboring
municipalities (Goodchild 1987). The analysis of these
spatial correlations considers that all the phenomena
are  interrelated  in  space,  but  generally,  the  closest
ones are more connected than the distant ones (Ál-
varez  and  González  2012).  We  conducted  the  ex-
ploratory spatial  analysis of the municipal homicide
rate  in  three  stages.  The  first  stage  examines  the
homicide rate spatial distribution. In the second, the
global spatial autocorrelation analysis is integrated by
Moran’s I, a global indicator that enables the assess-
ment of the existence of spatial autocorrelation in all
units across space. In the third, we performed an anal-
ysis of local spatial correlation, using a local indicator
of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) to detect clusters of
municipalities according to the association with each
and all neighbors (Anselin 1995; Sánchez Jabba et al.
2012).
The LISA indicators are particularly useful because
they allow us to break the spatial association into four
categories. The High-High (HH) category occurs when
a location with an above-average homicide rate is sur-
rounded by neighbors whose values are also above av-
erage; this group is also known as a  hot spot or high
violence cluster. The Low-Low (LL) scenario arises in
the opposite case, when a location with a below-aver-
age value is  surrounded by neighbors  whose values
are also below average; this is known as a cold spot or
low  violence  cluster.  There  are  two  categories  of  a
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negative correlation: In the High-Low (HL) category a
municipality that has an above-average value is sur-
rounded by neighbors whose values are below average
while in the Low-High (LH) category a location with
below-average  values  is  surrounded  by  neighbors
whose values are above average (Sánchez Jabba et al.
2012). To calculate Moran’s I, we used the free soft-
ware GeoDa 1.8.16.4. The estimation of the LISAs was
performed using the default permutation method (999
permutations). GeoDa uses a randomization approach
to generate a spatially random reference distribution
for  assessing  statistical  significance (a  numeric  per-
mutation  approach  to  describe  the  computation  of
pseudo-significance levels for global and local spatial
autocorrelation statistics).4 The level of statistical sig-
nificance chosen for this research was 95 percent. For
maps indicating statistically significant relations see
the Appendix.
With this  information, we chose four  clusters that
had consistently high homicide rates during the ten
years  under  analysis,  as  it  was  likely  opposing
sovereignties would be present there. The selection of
the clusters was not made using a statistical signifi-
cance criterion. The selected municipalities must rep-
resent what happens when different sovereignties co-
exist in any given municipality over time.
These four clusters match the historical spatial pres-
ence of  organized crime identified by Fuerte,  Pérez,
and Córdova (2018). These authors identified the spa-
tial presence of criminal groups and the violence they
produce using a purpose-built database. The clusters
we analyzed match those identified by Fuerte, Pérez,
and  Córdova  (2018)  as  hosting  the  Los  Zetas,  the
Juarez Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and
the  Michoacan  Family.  Despite  the  limitations  this
database  may  have,  it  is  one  of  the  few  available
sources of  information on the violence produced by
criminal groups linked to narcotics. 
We also searched national, regional, and local news-
papers for the presence of sovereign groups over a pe-
riod of ten years (2005 to 2015). This information al-
lowed us to propose some initial analytical concepts
for detecting the presence of organized crime groups
within the violence clusters. In this way, we sought to
4 httpps://geodacenter.github.io/workbook/6a_local_auto/
lab6a.html#ref-deCastroSinger:06
complement  the  spatial  correlation  analysis  con-
ducted by calculating the LISAs, suggesting a line of
research.  We  studied  a  total  of  311  news  articles.5
Journalistic resources are crucial for analyzing groups
that practice violence in Mexico due to the scarcity
and unreliability of official information (Davis 2007).
Such secondary sources are useful because they allow
us to obtain information on certain violent events (lo-
cation and date, the participants’ profiles, actions, and
consequences)  and provide a broad picture of  these
events (Río 2008). This allows us to establish, up to a
certain point, the presence of actors over time in a de-
termined space, more so if we consider both the na-
tional and local media (Río 2008). Thus, the press is a
relevant form of media for identifying clusters of col-
lective action, such as the violence practiced by cer-
tain social groups (Olzak 1989). Additionally, if these
collective acts are repeated in the press over time, it
suggests that these reports probably reflect the actual
social  dynamics  of  violence  rather  than the  press’s
whims or interests  (Barranco and Wisler  1989).  The
journalistic  information  was  processed  without  any
particular statistical analysis. The aim was to connect
this type of information with the distribution of vio-
lence in particular municipalities. This combination of
journalistic  information  and  quantitative  analysis
aims to reveal the sovereign forces operating in the
municipalities with a strong spatial correlation.
However, it is necessary to be aware of the limita-
tions  of  working  with  such sources.  Journalistic  re-
ports can be partial and biased in their interpretations
of the motives of the participants, the attribution of
causes  and responsibilities,  and the overall  explana-
tion  of  what  happened.  This  is  because  journalists
build their arguments on frameworks of interpretation
bound to specific moral references and linked to the
agenda of their newspaper (Río 2008). Moreover, the
local  and national  press  sometimes gather the data
they use to produce their reports from low-credibility
sources, and they are not always cross-checked with
other sources.
Additionally, the profit motive sometimes fosters the
addition of sensationalist elements—even if, as occurs
5 In this paper, we present only some of the news articles as 
examples or illustrations that allow us to show the pro-
cesses of violence and the presence of sovereign groups in 
the selected municipalities. 
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in Mexico, fear of retaliation sometimes stops journal-
ists  from  publishing  the  information  they  possess.
Considering that journalistic reports should be han-
dled carefully to prevent bias and optimize their ad-
vantages as sources of information, we carried out ex-
ercises  to  compare  the  news  items  and  establish  a
sufficiently  plausible  framework  of  interpretation
(Davis 2007). This allowed us to identify the presence
of  sovereign  groups  in  spaces  with  a  high  rate  of
homicidal violence (in the  hot spots),  thus providing
an initial exploratory conjecture regarding the results
of the spatial correlation analysis.
3 Spaces of Violence
In Mexico, violence is concentrated in certain spaces.
Homicides  represented  3.43  percent  of  the  total
deaths  registered  in  1990,  with  a  minimum of  1.72
percent  in  2007 and a  maximum of  4.61  percent  in
2011; and the level in 2016 was 3.58 percent. Homicide
rates decreased between 1990 and 2007, with a reduc-
tion of almost 60 percent (from 19.4 to 8.3 homicides
per 100,000) (Figure 1). An increase in homicide rates
occurred after 2007, peaking in 2011 (at almost triple
the value in 2007) and subsequently decreasing until
2014 (but increasing again in 2015 and 2016).
In 2005, the states with the highest homicide rates
were Guerrero,  Chihuahua, Michoacán, Sinaloa,  and
Oaxaca (more than 16 homicides per 100,000).  That
year, the states with the highest proportion of munici-
palities with very high homicide rates (over 50.7 homi-
cides per 100,000) were Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Sonora,
and Durango, with over 10 percent (Figure 2); mortal-
ity was above the national  average in eleven states
(Table 1).  Yucatán and Aguascalientes presented the
lowest  mortality,  with  rates  under  3  homicides  per
100,000.
In 2010, homicide mortality increased, and the phe-
nomenon spread at a municipal level within certain
states. The states with the highest homicide rates that
year  were  Chihuahua,  Sinaloa,  Durango,  Guerrero,
and  Nayarit  (more  than  40  homicides  per  100,000).
There was also a noticeable increase in the number of
very violent municipalities in Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Du-
rango, Nuevo León, Sonora and Tamaulipas. In each of
these states, more than 30 percent of municipalities
were very violent, with more than 60.8 homicides per
100,000 (Figure 2). Chihuahua and Sinaloa stand out:
in these states, more than 66 percent of municipalities
had a very high level  of  homicide mortality.  At the
state  level  violence  was  more  concentrated  in  2010
than in 2005, with ten states featuring a homicide rate
above  the  national  average,  and the  state  with  the
highest  mortality  (Chihuahua)  showing  a  mortality
rate 6.5 times higher than the average. Yucatán had 
Figure 1: Standardized homicide mortality rate, Mexico, 1990 to 2016
Source: data from INEGI, 1990–2016. 
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Figure 2: Homicide mortality rate in Mexico at municipal level, 2005, 2010, and 2015
a: 2005
b: 2010
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c: 2015
Source: data from INEGI. Maps created by the authors using GeoDa version 1.8.16.4.
Figure 3: Local indicators of spatial association (LISA) in Mexico, 2005, 2010, and 2015
a: 2005
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b: 2010
c: 2015
Source: data from INEGI. Maps created by the authors using GeoDa version 1.8.16.4.
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the lowest homicide mortality rate (2.1 homicides per
100,000).
In 2015, the most violent states were Guerrero, Chi-
huahua, Colima, Sinaloa, and Morelos, all with more
than 27 homicides per 100,000; a high number of very
violent municipalities (with more than 60.7 homicides
per 100,000) was found in Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guer-
rero, and Sonora, accounting for more than 20 percent
of the municipalities in each state (Figure 2). In twelve
states the mortality rate was above the national aver-
age.  Yucatán  and  Aguascalientes  had  the  lowest
homicide rates (less than 3.7 homicides per 100,000).
The Moran’s  I  estimations  for  the  three  analyzed
years (2005, 2010, and 2015) reveal the existence of a
positive  autocorrelation  of  homicide  mortality  rates
among the 2,457 municipalities in Mexico. In 2005, the
value was 0.21,  increasing to 0.46 in  2010 and then
falling  to  0.25  in  2015.  This  means  that  homicides
were not randomly distributed among the municipali-
ties. Rather, there was a statistically significant rela-
tionship with homicide rates in neighboring munici-
palities. 
The homicide rate clusters are shown on Figure 3
based on the LISAs.  In  2005,  the spaces of  violence
(category  HH),  or  hot  spots,  were  divided  into  two
very  clear  areas  in  the  northwest  and south of  the
country. Clusters of high violence represented 5.9 per-
cent of all  municipalities (145).  These spaces of vio-
lence  included  municipalities  in  the  neighboring
north-western states of Sonora,  Sinaloa,  Chihuahua,
and Durango (the  latter  three  forming the  “Golden
Triangle”), and in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Oaxaca.
In both regions, we found areas that form continuous
spaces  of  violence  in  which armed organized  crime
groups linked to the production and distribution of
narcotics operate and where self-defense groups and
federal, state and local police organizations, as well as
Mexican  military  and  navy  detachments,  are  inter-
twined. Each of these groups can exert a variant of
necro-power. We also observed an area of continuous
violence including municipalities in the northern re-
gion, in Nuevo León and Tamaulipas. The municipali-
ties  constituting  low violence  clusters  (category  LL)
were  concentrated  mainly  in  Yucatán,  Veracruz,
Puebla, Tlaxcala, Coahuila, and Hidalgo. It is impor-
tant to highlight that nearly 11.1 percent of all munic-
Table 1: Standardized homicide mortality rate per 
100000 in Mexico at state level, 2005, 2010, and 
2015
2005 2010 2015
National 9.70 21.51 18.00
Aguascalientes 2.47 7.01 3.72
Baja California 15.88 38.95 24.89
Baja California Sur 5.58 7.10 21.11
Campeche 5.48 6.46 8.66
Coahuila 4.96 17.27 11.76
Colima 8.56 18.20 43.96
Chiapas 9.06 7.06 10.71
Chihuahua 17.56 138.13 46.14
Distrito Federal 9.38 11.23 12.41
Durango 11.94 67.19 14.83
Guanajuato 4.09 9.67 17.53
Guerrero 23.13 62.53 67.03
Hidalgo 2.99 6.02 7.79
Jalisco 6.81 14.93 15.00
México 13.67 14.13 16.36
Michoacán 19.06 19.74 24.04
Morelos 9.03 22.22 27.03
Nayarit 13.20 40.56 12.86
Nuevo Leon 3.32 23.58 10.77
Oaxaca 16.85 18.82 20.61
Puebla 6.90 7.18 10.75
Queretaro 4.61 5.03 6.38
Quintana Roo 9.22 11.51 9.82
San Luis Potosi 6.32 12.51 10.77
Sinaloa 16.26 68.11 39.57
Sonora 10.27 22.74 20.76
Tabasco 6.11 9.02 14.36
Tamaulipas 10.01 23.52 22.39
Tlaxcala 4.80 6.79 7.13
Veracruz 4.91 9.49 13.24
Yucatan 2.20 2.12 2.64
Zacatecas 6.25 12.90 24.12
Source: data from INEGI.
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ipalities in the country (274) can be considered peace-
ful.
As a result of the war against drug trafficking, the
spaces  of  violence  in  northwestern  Mexico  grew in
2010, encompassing almost all of the municipalities in
Sinaloa,  81  percent  of  the  municipalities  in  Chi-
huahua,  more  than  half  of  those  in  Durango,  and
more than one third of those in Nuevo León, Sonora
and Tamaulipas (Figure 3). A total of 7.3 percent of all
municipalities (181) were considered hot spots. This in-
crease was accompanied by a decrease in spaces of vi-
olence in southern Mexico. The corridor of violence in
Michoacán and Guerrero shrunk,  focused mainly  in
Guerrero. Spaces of violence disappeared in the region
between Oaxaca  and Guerrero,  but  expanded along
the border between Nuevo León and Tamaulipas. The
number of peaceful municipalities expanded in com-
parison to 2005, with 361 municipalities (14.7 percent)
classed as low-violence clusters. That expansion pre-
sented mainly in the Yucatán peninsula (municipali-
ties in Campeche and Quintana Roo), in the center of
Chiapas, and in central Mexico (Puebla, Tlaxcala, Hi-
dalgo, and Querétaro).
In 2015, after the authorities reduced the intensity
of joint operations against drug trafficking, the zones
of violence returned to their 2005 range (Figure 3). Vi-
olence stayed at higher levels than in 2005, with 6 per-
cent of all municipalities in high-violence clusters. A
higher  concentration  of  spaces  of  violence  was  ob-
served in  the  region  of  the  Golden  Triangle  (south
Chihuahua, north Sinaloa, and north Durango). Nev-
ertheless, was observed that the operational and man-
agement capabilities of different groups increased in
the  south,  between  Michoacán  and  Guerrero.  The
southern region of the state of Oaxaca presented an
increase in violence, in contrast with the situation in
northern Mexico, where the extent of spaces of vio-
lence was reduced. The concentration of peaceful spa-
ces moved from the center to the east (north Puebla,
Querétaro, Hidalgo, San Luis Potosí, south Coahuila,
and south Nuevo León) and Aguascalientes, while low
mortality rates prevailed in the Yucatán peninsula and
northeast Oaxaca. Notably, 11.9 percent of all the mu-
nicipalities formed low–homicide mortality clusters in
2015.
4 Necro-Power Forces
These violence scenarios suggest that by 2005 there
was already a necro-power presence in some areas of
the country, a power exerted by different sovereign-
ties. The war on drug trafficking launched by the fed-
eral government in 2008 resulted in those spaces of vi-
olence expanding, particularly in the northwest. Once
the federal government left aside the use of the term
“war on drug trafficking” to refer to its policy on drug
production and distribution and ceased the joint oper-
ations, the spaces of violence shrank back to the spa-
tial limits prevailing in 2005. This does not mean that
violence disappeared, but it apparently adapted to the
historical or traditional spatial limits where different
actors exerted the power to decide the life and death
of the population.
The violence clusters that persist over time identify
spaces  where  there  is  conflict  between  different
necro-powers. In some cases, non-state actors coexist
with  local  power  regimes and may cohabit  with  or
confront the state’s mode of operation—acting within
the institutional  framework or outside of  it.  Fuerte,
Pérez, and Córdova (2018) note that in territories with
criminal violence, there are different relationships be-
tween groups linked to drug trafficking, the military,
the police, and government authorities, these relation-
ships  generate  tactical  arrangements  among  them-
selves  through  bribery  and  state  capture.  These
groups include social actors such as the police or the
military—which move in a liminal space between le-
gality  and  illegality—armed  private  security  forces
and organized crime groups, forms of social organiza-
tions (such as community guards that exercise justice
via  customary  rights)  and  vigilante  and  organized
crime  groups.  These  groups  establish  different  rela-
tionships with each other.  As Desmond-Arias  (2010)
suggests,  their presence creates a certain social  and
political order.
This political and social order can be appreciated es-
pecially if we consider some of the clusters with the
highest homicidal violence rates during the analyzed
period.  The most  meaningful  cases  are  the  clusters
formed around the municipalities  of  Badiraguato in
northeastern Sinaloa in the Western Sierra Madre re-
gion, San Miguel Totolapan in the uppermost South-
ern Sierra Madre region in the state of Guerrero, Val-
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lecillo in Nuevo León, and Coalcomán de Vázquez Pal-
lares in southwestern Michoacán. Except for Vallecillo,
these are municipalities where narcotics are histori-
cally grown and processed. These activities have de-
veloped due to the coexistence of and agreements be-
tween the federal forces, local political structures, and
the groups linked to the production of these narcotics
(Astorga 2005; Fuerte, Pérez, and Córdova 2018). The
Badiraguato  municipality  is  one  of  the  corners  the
“Golden  Triangle,”  where  opium poppies  have  been
grown since the 1920s (Astorga 1995). Marijuana crops
have recently been integrated, and laboratories have
been set up to manufacture synthetic drugs. This ter-
ritory  has  had  a  heavy  military  presence  since  the
middle  of  the  twentieth  century  and  is  where  the
“Sinaloa Cartel” has operated since the 1980s (Fuerte,
Pérez, and Córdova 2018; Rio Doce 2016).
The San Miguel  Totolapan (Guerrero) municipality
is  the  gateway to the highest  part  of  the Southern
Sierra  Madre,  where  marijuana  and  opium poppies
are grown. To the north, it borders Arcelia, where the
criminal  group  La  Familia  Michoacán  is  operating.
This criminal group was founded at the beginning of
the century in Michoacán (Fuerte, Pérez, and Córdova
2018). In the late nineties, it was already a territory
where criminal groups linked to drug trafficking were
present and different federal armed forces were oper-
ating. Lately, it has become the center of operations of
two criminal groups in confrontation, “Los tequileros”
and “Guerreros Unidos” (La Prensa 2014).  The press
even notes that “Los tequileros” have a military unit
with  strategic  capabilities  matching  those  of  the
armed federal forces (El Debate 2016). In this context,
a community self-defense group named “Movimiento
Totolapanense para la paz” has recently appeared.
The Vallecillo  cluster is  characterized by the pres-
ence of a group of hitmen self-styled “Los Zetas”; this
group is made up of deserters from the Special Forces
Air Group of the Mexican military and was initially
allied with the “Cartel del Golfo” (Brophy 2008). The
area hosting this cluster is characterized by its com-
plex desert geography, which allows the maintenance
of  safe  houses  and  training  camps  for  “Los
Zetas.”(Amigos de Tamaulipas 2011) It is also a point
of  connection  between  Monterrey,  the  capital  of
Nuevo León, and the border city of Nuevo Laredo in
Tamaulipas, which is an entry point into the United
States. It is, therefore, a strategic area not only for the
drug  trade  but  also  for  the  illegal  weapons  market
(Proceso 2005). The cluster around Vallecillo is strate-
gic for criminal groups—for “Los Zetas” as well as for
the “Cartel del Golfo”—and government forces due to
its  geographic  location  (Fuerte,  Pérez,  and Córdova
2018).
The cluster around the municipality of Coalcomán
de Vázquez Pallares has become a space characterized
by  the  growth  and  trafficking  of  drugs  in  the  last
twenty years and has also seen the arrival of illegal
logging  operations  and  timber  trafficking  in  recent
years. These municipalities hold a privileged position
because they connect the harbors of Lázaro Cárdenas
in Michoacán and Manzanillo in Colima. It is there-
fore a space that sees drug traffic from Tierra Caliente
to the most important ports on the Mexican Pacific
coast. At first, the municipality and its neighbors were
characterized  by  their  marijuana  plantations.  There
are even signs that the production of this plant is cur-
rently carried out using sophisticated irrigation sys-
tems  that  require  a  specific  infrastructure  (Rosiles
2013). However, in recent years, the territory has been
turning  into  a  producer  of  methamphetamine.  The
area  is  contested  by  the  “Caballeros  Templarios,”  a
group that has its origins in the Michoacana Family
and  the  “Cartel  Jalisco  Nueva  Generación”  (Fuerte,
Pérez, and Córdova 2018). As with other municipali-
ties in the same situation, the presence of the army
has not ended illegal activities and violence. In May
2013, a significant part of the community’s citizenry
took up arms and established a community self-de-
fense organization in an effort to counter the activity
of criminal groups in the territory (World News Net-
work 2016). This cluster is therefore characterized by
the presence  of  a  social  order  branded by violence,
where armed organizations—legal and illegal—dispute
control over the territory and the merchandise pass-
ing through it (Álvarez 2017).
These  four  snapshots  highlight  how  the  spatial
structural  logic  of  violent  homicides—or  the  spatial
autocorrelation  of  homicidal  violence—is  related  to
the  presence  of  certain  actors—organized  crime
groups,  community  self-defense  groups,  and  state
forces—that create necro-spaces through their necro-
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political capabilities. We consider that the analysis of
these actors  allowed us to understand,  to a  degree,
the  establishment  of  certain  violence  regimes  that
work as an integrated and organic system: integrated
because while they rest upon the actions of individu-
als and groups, their explicit and implicit relationships
of confrontation and agreement with each other cre-
ate a system; organic because different actors use vio-
lence as a mechanism to support these relationships,
facilitating not only confrontation but also the estab-
lishment of pacts.
5 Conclusion
This  article  analyzed  the  convergence  of  different
sovereignties in the spatial distribution of violence in
Mexico. To this end, we used a methodology that al-
lowed us to understand the structural  conditions of
necro-spaces.  The results  indicate that violence in a
specific place does not occur by chance; it is linked to
broader territorial and social dynamics, where social
and institutional actors show a significant ability to
regulate movement of people and decide on the life
and death of the population. We applied a methodol-
ogy that connected two ways of collecting and ana-
lyzing information: one that allowed us to establish
the spatial autocorrelation of homicidal violence and
another that showed the presence of groups with the
capacity to exercise sovereignty. In this way, we aimed
to establish a bridge between the spatial relationships
among the homicides occurring at a local scale and
descriptions of the groups that build regimes of vio-
lence in those spaces, highlighting the importance of
introducing  elements  of  a  qualitative  nature  as  ex-
ploratory factors into the study of spatial and demo-
graphic relations.
We believe that this type of research allows us to
complement other studies relying solely on statistical
analysis that, though they relate violence to factors of
a socio-demographic and economic nature, treat vari-
ables of a qualitative order as secondary. This paper
did not intend to carry out an in-depth exploration of
violence  regimes,  which  would  involve  developing
field  explorations  of  an  anthropologic  and  ethno-
graphic nature and more detailed attention to the his-
tory of the social contexts. Instead, it aimed to show
the relevance of social dynamics in strengthening cer-
tain actors and allows exploratory approaches of the
structural, spatial logics of violence to be conducted.
Thus, these logics could be the result of several armed
groups’ activities—legal and illegal—that complement
each other.
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